• Identifiant
    • GDYK9cJD
  • Contenu de la note
  • However, Plato nowhere fully discusses the question of evil. Guthrie (1978, vol. 5, 92-100) reviews the question and its treatment by scholars, who are divided on the consistency of Plato’s approach ; some consider that he moved away from a monistic position, in which evil is seen as the absence of good, to a dualism where there is a positive evil force at work in the world. (See further Cherniss [1971, 244-258].) Plotinus affirms the monistic approach in many places, especially in the anti-Gnostic treatise II.9. I.8 is devoted to a discussion of evil ; chapter 3 establishes the concept of absolute evil, and chapter 5 identifies this evil with matter, and it is further defined in chapter 7, where Plotinus begins by stating that evil is the necessary antithesis of good : “But why is it necessary for evil to exist if good does ? Is it because matter must exist in the universe ? Yes, because the universe is of necessity made up of contraries, and would not exist if matter did not exist.” This is supported by Timaeus 47e5-48a1, and Theaetetus 176a6 : “There must always be an opposite to good.” Plotinus describes matter as the end of the procession from the Good at I.8.7, 17ff.: “Since the Good is not the only thing that exists, it is necessary that, by the procession from it, the Last should exist—after which nothing else can come into being—and this is evil. What is after the First is of necessity, so that the Last too is of necessity. This is matter, which has nothing of the Good in it ; and this is the necessity of evil.”

  • Remarques de l'éditeur
  • Luciana Santoprete
    • Contexte
    • Commentaire au Traité 6 (IV, 8), 5, 24-37
    • Page
    • 158
  • Sources modernes
  • +
  • Sources anciennes
  • + + +
  • Mots-clefs français
  • + + + +
  • Liens
  • Appartenances
  • Traité 6 (IV, 8), 5, 37 + Traité 33 (II, 9) (entier) + Traité 51 (I, 8) (entier)