• Identifiant
    • zencQXRW
  • Contenu de la note
  • Plotinus starts the treatise with an analysis of our concept of human freedom and it is from this that he ascends, with considerable trepidation but admitting that he has no better starting-point, to consider the freedom of the One which is the main subject of the work. At chapter 7 he introduces a “rash statement starting from a different way of thinking” which says that since the Good “happens to be as it is, and does not have the mastery of what it is, and is what it is not from itself, it would not have freedom, and its doing or not doing what it is necessitated to do or not to do is not in its power.” It is not clear whether Plotinus regards this as a positive statement of a doctrine other than his own or as an objection to his own doctrine ; and if the latter, whether it is a possible objection which he has himself thought of or an objection which he has actually heard from others ; a view of my own that it comes from a Christian source much concerned to assert the absolute freedom of God’s will has not been generally accepted (A. H. Armstrong, “Two Views of Freedom” in Studia Patristica XVIII, Pergamon Press, Oxford 1982, 397-406). But however that may be, he takes it very seriously, and concentrates in the rest of the treatise on establishing his own doctrine of the One against it. It is in doing this that he uses language more likely than anything else in the Enneads to commend his version of Platonism to theists (Platonist, Jewish or Christian) accustomed to think of God as a Supreme Being possessed of intelligence and will ; though, as has already been said, he is careful to show that this positive language is in no way inconsistent with his negative theology.

  • Remarques de l'éditeur
  • Luciana Santoprete
    • Contexte
    • Note d’introduction au Traité 39 (VI, 8)
    • Page
    • 223-224
  • Sources modernes
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  • Sources anciennes
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  • Mots-clefs français
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  • Liens
  • Appartenances
  • Traité 39 (VI, 8) (entier)